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Abstract. Generic DPA attacks, such as MIA, have been recently pro-
posed as a method to mount DPA attacks without the need for possibly
restrictive assumptions on the leakage behaviour. Previous work iden-
tified some shortcomings of generic DPA attacks when attacking injec-
tive targets (such as the AES Sbox output). In this paper, we focus on
that particular property of generic DPA attacks and explain limitations,
workarounds and advantages. Firstly we show that the original fix to
address this issue (consisting of dropping bits on predictions to destroy
the injectivity) works in practice. Secondly, we describe how a deter-
mined attacker can circumvent the issue of attacking injective targets
and mount a generic attack on the AES using previously mentioned non-
injective targets. Thirdly, we explain important and attractive properties
of generic attacks, such as being effective under any leakage behaviour.
Consequently, we are able to recover keys even if the attacker only ob-
serves an encrypted version of the leakage, for instance when a device is
using bus encryption with a constant key. The same property also allows
to mount attacks on later rounds of the AES with a reduced number
of key hypotheses compared to classical DPA. All main observations are
supported by experimental results, when possible on real measurements.
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1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks pose nowadays a significant threat for the security of cryp-
tographic embedded devices. Since the first publication [8] in 1996, a respectable
body of academic research on side-channel attacks and countermeasures has been
produced. Besides, side-channel attacks are not only a topic of academic research
but also relevant to industry. Present embedded security devices, such as bank
cards, phone SIMs and electronic passports normally feature some kind of pro-
tection against side-channel attacks.
An important class of side-channel attacks are Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) attacks, introduced in [9] by Kocher et al. They showed that crypto-
graphic keys could be extracted from embedded devices by first measuring their
instantaneous power consumption while performing cryptographic operations
and subsequently performing a statistical analysis of the power consumption
measurements. The relatively inexpensive equipment needed for performing DPA
attacks greatly increases the threat of this family of attacks.
Since [9], a substantial work on the so-called distinguisher in DPA attacks
has been carried out [2,4,6,13,10]. In a nutshell, this trend tries to optimize the
performance of a DPA attack, measured in the number of traces needed for a
successful attack, under the assumption that the device leaks information in a
specific manner, usually Hamming weight (HW) or Hamming distance (HD).
Pearson’s sample correlation coefficient distinguisher is a popular choice when
mounting DPA attacks (also known as CPA attacks) on devices whose behaviour
can be linearly approximated by some leakage model (usually HD or HW) given
beforehand (essentially, acquired based on previous knowledge of the chip and
its implementation).
The choice of leakage model when attacking a device is crucial. In fact, there
must be some correspondence between the leakage behaviour of the device and
the leakage model for the attack to succeed. An example of this requirement
is shown in [19], where CPA is shown to fail if the model is sufficiently wrong.
Actually, there is a whole family of countermeasures that try to alter the leakage
signal such that it becomes more difficult to model, and thus make the attack
harder. One example of a countermeasure belonging to this family is balanced
circuits, such as dual-rail logic (for instance WDDL [16]). While in theory dual-
rail logic aims at producing data independent leakage, in practice, imperfectly-
balanced dual-rail implementations produce a leakage behaviour that is difficult
to model, rendering DPA attacks that employ inexact, non-corresponding leakage
models ineffective [15] (although in practice regression-based approaches that
perform a leakage modeling on the fly [20] can provide good results).
An important enhancement of power analysis are profiled attacks, such as [5]
and [14]. These attacks do not require a leakage model previously known to
the practitioner, but instead derive the leakage model itself in a profiling step
that characterizes the device. The attack step is usually based on Maximum
Likelihood classification and can be shown to be optimal if the derived model is
sound. During the profiling step, the attacker has virtually unlimited access to
a device identical to the device under attack. This access might be difficult to
obtain in reality. In short, profiled attacks are a powerful attack strategy that is
carried out by a strong adversary.
Recently, several (non-profiled) DPA strategies have been proposed that try
to bring the best from both worlds: on the one hand, they do not require a leakage
model of the device given beforehand, and thus they could be potentially applied
against any device; on the other hand, these generic strategies do not require
a profiling step, so that even a weak adversary can perform them. Typically
these generic strategies work with measurements in a nominal scale. Exemplary
generic DPA strategies are based on Mutual Information [7], on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance [17], on the Crame´r-von-Mises test [17] or on copulas [18]. We
will use MIA in this paper but results apply to all of them.
Despite the attractive properties of generic DPA attacks, earlier papers have
identified some theoretical shortcomings of these attacks regarding injective tar-
gets [7,18,19,20]. This paper addresses the practical relevance of these theoretical
shortcomings and explores limitations, workarounds and advantages of generic
DPA attacks.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we present
experimental evidence confirming that the “bit drop” trick already proposed
in [7] to attack injective targets works even in realistic environments with high,
but not infinite, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Secondly, we show that by carefully
redefining the non-injective targets of the attack, it is indeed possible to launch a
fully generic MIA attack on the AES. Thirdly, we demonstrate that precisely the
same apparently unappealing property that causes MIA to fail against injective
targets enables an attacker to launch MIA attacks exploiting the leakage from an
encrypted bus, or from later rounds of AES at reduced number of key hypotheses
compared to a traditional DPA attack. The experimental results we provide do
not contradict any theoretical result from [18,19,20], but clarify the practical
relevance of the issues.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
reviews previous work. Section 3 presents some practical experiments regarding
the practical applicability of the “bit drop” trick. Section 4 elaborates on a
generic MIA attack against the AES. Section 5 studies some properties of MIA
that can be exploited to mount MIA attacks on later rounds, and Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Previous work
In this section we recall the fundamental concepts for MIA attacks and we state
the issues that arise when performing MIA attacks on injective targets.
2.1 Notation
Capital letters in bold face, e.g. X, denote random variables. Lower-case letters,
e.g. x, denote a specific realization of X, e.g. X = x. The plaintext byte number
i is denoted by pi. The i-th key byte is denoted by ki. The function dropi drops
i least significant bits of its argument. The expression I(X; Y) denotes Mutual
Information between X and Y, and is defined [7] as
I(X; Y) = H(X)−H(X|Y) (1)
where H(·) denotes Shannon entropy. S denotes some operation within the com-
putation of a cryptographic primitive. In particular, we denote the AES Sbox by
SAES. Ldevice denotes the leakage behaviour of the cryptographic device. Lmodel
denotes a leakage model. Id is the identity function. HW denotes the Hamming
weight function.  denotes a Gaussian noise process, its standard deviation is
clear from the context.
2.2 Original MIA
MIA was originally introduced in [7] as a new information-theoretic distinguisher
that aims at detecting any kind of dependency between observed measurements
and predicted power consumption. MIA was different from previous distinguisher
flavours in the sense that it is a generic tool suitable for attacking a wide variety
of target devices without a priori knowledge, instead of an efficient tool that
does require a priori assumptions about the target device. In this respect, MIA
neither requires specific knowledge about the exact relation between processed
data and observed measurements (leakage behaviour) nor requires to model such
behaviour under a leakage model.
More precisely, to target some intermediate value Z = S(P⊕k), MIA uses as
distinguisher the value of the Mutual Information between the observed measure-
ments O = Ldevice(Z) and the predicted power consumption H = Lmodel(Zk)
based on a key guess,
I(O; H). (2)
MIA computes the value of Eq. (2) for each key hypothesis k, ranks the key can-
didates according to decreasing values of I(O; H) and selects the key candidate
as the one that maximizes the Mutual Information value.
In contrast to other previous distinguishers, such as Pearson’s sample corre-
lation coefficient, the Mutual Information value between two random variables
expresses the degree of statistical dependency between these two variables, inde-
pendently of the specific form that the potential dependency between variables
may take. This powerful property allows the attacker to skip modelling the leak-
age behaviour Ldevice. As a matter of fact, in [7] it was mentioned that the
attacker can directly plug in Eq. (2) the hypothesized values handled by the de-
vice as the predicted power consumption by setting H = Id(Z). By doing so, the
attacker does not place any restrictive assumption on the leakage behaviour and
thus the attack is expected to work against any device that leaks “somehow”.
Moreover, should some information about the leakage behaviour be available
beforehand, then that can be used to improve the efficiency of the MIA attack
[7], but this is not required for an attack to succeed.
2.3 Issues with injective targets
In several references [7,20] it was noted that for injective targets S (for instance,
S = SAES(P⊕k)) a straightforward application of Eq. (2) with a generic leakage
model by setting H = Id(Z) would result in an ineffective attack. Actually, dif-
ferent key hypotheses just imply a permutation of the values H, and thus result
in equally meaningful partitions of the observed measurements. This, in turn,
leads to the same value for the Mutual Information of Eq. (2) for each key hy-
pothesis, and therefore renders the discrimination of the correct key impossible.
Note that this result is not exclusive to MIA, but it extends to a broad set of
carefully defined generic attacks, as Whitnall et al. formally reason in [20].
In [7], the authors proposed a fix to solve this issue. They suggested dropping
one bit in the predictions, H = drop1(Z), effectively destroying the phenomenon
of different keys causing equivalent (up to a permutation) values of H, yet pre-
serving the generic nature of the attack. This fix is called the “bit drop trick”
throughout this paper. They provided empirical evidence of the correctness of
this method against one AES Sbox output byte S = SAES(p⊕k) with real power
measurements using three bits of the prediction, H = drop5(Z).
The bit drop trick has been studied more thoroughly in [18,19]. First, in [18],
Veyrat-Charvillon and Standaert provide experiments in a noiseless simulated
scenario where the device leaks exactly Hamming weights Ldevice(Z) = HW(Z)
and the target is the AES Sbox output Z = SAES(p⊕k). The predictions consist
of the intermediate value Z when a variable amount of bits are dropped: H =
dropi(Z) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}. In this situation, they show that although a MIA
attack that uses H = dropi(Z) for i ∈ {7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2} works, a MIA attack that
uses H = drop1(Z) unexpectedly fails.
In addition, in [19], Whitnall et al. further study this effect by taking the envi-
ronmental noise into account with Ldevice(Z) = HW(Z)+. They conclude, from
simulations, that a MIA attack on the AES Sbox output using H = drop1(Z) as
predictions will fail for large values of the signal-to-noise ratio (that is, when the
noise  has small variance). On the other hand, when the signal-to-noise is below
a certain threshold, MIA attacks with H = drop1(Z) will eventually succeed.
Hence, it was shown that there are high-SNR scenarios where the bit drop trick
does not work.
3 Practical relevance of the bit drop trick
In this section, we experimentally verify the practical relevance of the negative
results regarding dropping some bits in the predictions.
We performed all the experiments for this paper on an 8-bit micro controller
from Atmel’s AVR family running an unprotected implementation of AES-128.
We obtained 10, 000 power traces from encryptions of randomly chosen plaintexts
covering the first one and a half rounds. The card is clocked at 4 MHz and the
sampling frequency is 10 MS/s. The device leakage behaviour is known to be
close to Hamming weight, however, in what follows we do not make use of this
fact and proceed as if the leakage behaviour were unknown to us.
3.1 Dropping one bit
We performed a MIA attack targeting the first Sbox output, by setting as tar-
geted intermediate value the byte Z = SAES(P1 ⊕ k1) and dropping one bit on
the predictions H = drop1(Z) . The (non-parametric) density estimation pro-
cess was performed without placing any hypotheses on the leakage behaviour of
the device. Thus, densities were estimated with histograms with 256 bins, since
measurement samples have a resolution of 8 bits.
Figure 1 shows the result this attack when using 1, 000 traces at time sample
485. It can be observed that the attack is successful, the correct key clearly
stands out over all other competing key hypotheses. We confirmed that around
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Fig. 1. Left: evolution of the MIA attack targeting the intermediate value z = SAES(p⊕
k) dropping one bit in the predictions, H = drop1(Z), as the number of traces increases.
Correct key in black, incorrect key hypothesis in grey. Right: outcome of the attack
using 1, 000 traces.
time sample 485 the implementation performs the Sbox lookups from the first
round.
The experiment highlights the limited impact of the negative results in [19,18]
regarding the drop1 trick. We can hardly conceive a practical scenario with a
higher SNR than ours, since our platform (AVR) has relatively high leakage for
industry standards. Furthermore, in reality implementations will feature some
countermeasures that will only degrade the SNR. Thus, the negative results
of [19] regarding the bit drop trick in strong-signal settings are of theoretical
relevance but we conclude that the bit drop trick works in practical, high yet
finite SNR scenarios. In other words, the high SNR of our measurements is “low
enough” for the bit drop trick to work.
3.2 Dropping more than one bit
The experiment from Section 3.1 was repeated for a different amount of least
significant bits dropped, ranging from 1 to 7, following the spirit of [18]. All the
other parameters of the attack are kept constant: we focus on the same time
sample 485 and use the same Mutual Information estimation procedure with
histograms of 256 bins in order not to place any assumption about the leakage
behaviour during the density estimation process.
Figure 2, left, shows 7 plots for 7 different attacks. Each attack drops a
different number of bits (leftmost drops 1 bit, rightmost drops 7 bits). Each
subplot shows the evolution of the corresponding attack as the number of traces
increases.
The attacks are, in every case, successful. Note that the mutual information
decreases as the number of bits dropped increases. This is natural and can be
easily explained by expanding Eq. 2 as Eq. 1 and noting that H(O|H) will only
increase as H considers fewer bits of Z.
Albeit the attacks are eventually successful for any number of dropped bits,
the distinguishing capabilities are not the same. Figure 2, right, studies the effect
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Fig. 2. Left: evolution of the performance of the attack from Figure 1 for 1, 2, ..., 7
dropped bits. For each sub plot the X axis is number of traces and ranges from 200 to
1000. Correct key hypothesis is in black, incorrect key hypotheses are in grey. Right:
success rate of the same attacks as in left. Each line represents a fixed number of traces.
Bottommost line is 200 curves, next lines correspond to increments of 40 traces.
of different number of bits dropped on the success rate. Each line corresponds
to a fixed amount of power traces, starting with 200 curves for the line at the
bottom. All the parameters in the estimation process (number of bins) were kept
constant, allowing for a fair comparison.
We can see two main tendencies in Figure 2. First, as the number of dropped
bits increases, from 1 to 5, the success rate also increases, for a given number of
traces. Second, if the number of dropped bits continues increasing to 6 and 7,
the success rate drops. Thus, for this particular target and this particular attack,
the optimum number of bits to drop to maximize the success rate of this attack
is 5. We believe that this fact is the result of the superposition of two opposite
effects. As the number of dropped bits increases, the target becomes “more non-
injective” and thus the attack works better. This is true until a certain threshold
(in our case, 5 bits), from where the effect of the algorithmic noise introduced
by the dropped, unmodelled bits is predominant. Note that this observation
fits nicely with the classic result of Messerges in [11,12], who found that in the
context of d-bit DPA, modelling only 3 bits from an 8-bit bus gave the best SNR
for a fixed number of traces.
4 Non-injective targets on AES
There are situations, however, in which an attacker might not be able to use the
bit drop trick. As pointed out in the experiments in [19], if the leakage behaviour
of the device consists only of higher order terms, the bit drop trick will fail. In this
section, we note that an attacker who wishes to recover the key from an AES
implementation is not restricted to only performing attacks against the Sbox
output. Thus, he is not forced to employ the bit drop trick. Although we focus
on the AES, we expect that any reasonable block cipher contains non-injective
target functions.
In the rest of this section, we give an example of such a non-injective target
that enables generic MIA attacks. This target was briefly mentioned in [1], in
the following we provide a detailed study and show its attractive properties.
4.1 Suitable targets
There are suitable non-injective targets for an attack in AES. Intuitively speak-
ing, we want to find some intermediate value Z that results from the compression
of public and secret data. One such value Z suitable for generic MIA attacks nat-
urally arises as follows.
Let us take a closer look at the computation of the MixColumns transforma-
tion that is applied to the first column of the state during the first round. Name
(u, v, w, x) the 4-byte input column to this MixColumns transformation. These
4 input bytes correspond to 4 output bytes of ShiftRows in the first round. Sup-
pose that during the computation of the first output byte 2u⊕3v⊕w⊕x of this
MixColumns invocation, the implementation handles the partial intermediate
value z = 2u⊕ 3v = 2SAES(p1 ⊕ k1)⊕ 3SAES(p6 ⊕ k6)1. The target z = 2u⊕ 3v
is obviously non-injective (since it maps 16 bits of public input and 16 bits of
secret input to 8 bits) and suitable for a generic MIA attack. Below we provide
results of such an attack against our unprotected AES software implementation.
4.2 Practical results
Since we are attacking a non-injective target, we can use directly Z as the pre-
dicted power consumption (without the bit drop trick), and proceed with a
generic MIA attack on the 16 key bits (corresponding to key bytes 1 and 6).
That is, we use the identity leakage model H = Id(Z) = Z.
To perform the attack without placing any assumption on the leakage be-
haviour, Mutual Information was estimated using histograms with 256 bins. In
Figure 3 we can see that the attack works correctly: the correct key stands out
and the attack has a unique solution. Note also that the magnitude of the Mu-
tual Information values is different than in the previous section, this is because
we are targeting a different time sample, 523, corresponding to the computation
of MixColumns.
4.3 Different leakage behaviours
The bit drop trick is known not to work against devices with highly non-linear
leakage behaviours. However, a generic MIA attack against a non-injective target
does not suffer from this limitation and can be used in such cases.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to a chip with highly non-linear leak-
age behaviour. For this reason, we resort to simulations to give an example
of an attack against z = 2u ⊕ 3v on an hypothetical device that leaks as
1 Note that the sixth Sbox output of the first round will be in state byte 5 after first
round ShiftRows.
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Fig. 3. Left: evolution of the generic MIA attack targeting the intermediate value
z = 2SAES(p1⊕k1)⊕3SAES(p6⊕k6). Correct key in black, incorrect keys in grey. Time
sample index 523. Right: outcome of the attack using 3, 000 traces.
Ldevice(Z) = SAES(Z) (resembling a highly non-linear leakage behaviour) and as
Ldevice(Z) = HW(SAES(Z)) (resembling an encrypted bus scenario as explained
in the following section).
Figure 4 shows the outcomes of these attacks when the simulated curves
include Gaussian additive noise with standard deviation σ = 1. The attacks are
successful in both cases Ldevice(Z) = SAES(Z) and Ldevice(Z) = HW(SAES(Z)).
Mutual Information was estimated, as in previous cases, using histograms and
256 bins. The attacks are successful also when there is no noise σ = 0 in the
simulated traces.
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Fig. 4. Left: Simulation of the attack from Section under leakage behaviour Ldevice =
SAES. Right: idem, under Ldevice = HW(SAES)
To sum up, unlike the drop1 strategy on the AES Sbox output, generic MIA
attacks against non-injective target functions work under any leakage condition,
any SNR level at the expense of a slightly more costly computational effort of
216 key hypotheses.
5 Discussion
In this section we elaborate on the notable properties of the previous attack
that are of practical relevance when attacking devices with encrypted buses.
In addition, we comment on the possibility of mounting MIA attacks on later
rounds and discuss the implications of a parallel implementation of the AES.
5.1 Arbitrary leakage model and bus encryption
As already stated in Section 4.3, generic MIA attacks against non-injective tar-
gets in AES will work with any leakage behaviour. This fact has important
consequences for real-world devices that employ bus encryption (also called bus
scrambling.) We can successfully apply the attack of Section 4 even if the attacker
has only access to the leakage of some “encrypted” version of the intermediate
value (under a constant key), instead of the leakage of the actual intermediate
value. An advantage of this attack is that the adversary does not need to know
the exact details of the “encryption” function (for example, the key might be
unknown). The attacker launches the generic attack of Section 4 using as pre-
dictions the “unencrypted” values for the intermediate sensitive variable, disre-
garding the exact details of the encryption function. In what follows we explain
why this attack returns the correct key.
For instance, consider a smart-card that “encrypts” the values before sending
them over its bus2. Let Y be the “encrypted” value of Z, that is, Y = enc(Z)
for some bus “encryption” function enc (which is a permutation). We claim that
the following two attacks are equivalent (that is, have equal success rate):
1. A MIA attack against a device that handles the values in clear, O = Ldevice(Z)
and the attacker predictions correspond to the values in clear, H = Z.
2. A MIA attack against a device that handles the intermediate values en-
crypted, O = Ldevice(Y) and the attacker uses as predictions the values in
clear, H = Z.
We will show that both attacks produce the same values of mutual infor-
mation, I(Ldevice(Y); Lmodel(Z)) = I(Ldevice(Z); Lmodel(Z)), and thus have the
same behaviour. We can develop Eq. (2) as
I(Ldevice(Y); Lmodel(Z)) = I(Ldevice(Y); Lmodel(Y))
= I(Ldevice(Z); Lmodel(Z))
(3)
where the first line results from Y and Z being related by a permutation (note
that the attack from Section 4 uses Lmodel = Id) and the second line results
from Y and Z being identically (uniformly) distributed (thus, due to symmetry
2 Here we are assuming without loss of generality that the most leaking component of
the smart-card is the bus. This assumption is just for illustration purposes and the
following discussion is orthogonal to this assumption.
of H, the value of H(Z) − H(Z|Ldevice(Z)) does not change if the events of Z
are reordered).
Therefore, the previous result shows that the bus encryption has no effect on
generic DPA attacks and is transparent to them. The attacker can recover the
key observing leakage of the encrypted intermediate values, even if he ignores the
exact details of the bus encryption mechanism and the exact leakage behaviour
of the device.
5.2 Arbitrary leakage model and absorbing next round keys
The very same property used in the previous Subsection 5.1 can be exploited
to mount MIA attacks that use observations of intermediate values from the
second round at a reduced number of key hypotheses. The rationale is similar:
Suppose that the attacker chooses one output byte of MixColumns as the target,
z′′ = 2u ⊕ 3v ⊕ w ⊕ x. Assume that the value z′′ is later transformed into z′′′
through AddRoundKey and further into zIV through SubBytes of the second
round, z′′′ = AK(z′′) and zIV = SB(z′′′) as shown in Figure 5. These operations
merely permute z′′ (they do not introduce any other “variable” data), and thus
the result from Subsection 5.1 can be applied. The attacker can perform the
attack placing hypotheses on Z′′ as Lmodel(Z′′) = Id(Z′′) but he can use the
observations O corresponding to the handling of the intermediate value from
the second round such as zIV with a 232 work load. This is not possible with
standard DPA, unless the attacker places 8 additional bits on the key hypothesis
corresponding to one key byte from the second round, resulting in an attack with
240 work load.
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Fig. 5. A schematic representation of the computation of the first 1.5 rounds of AES.
As explained in Section 5.2, the attacker can use the leakage coming from later in the
computation, for instance, z′′′ after the next key addition or even zIV after the Sbox
lookup, without placing extra key hypotheses on the second round key k21.
This means that the attacker can easily bypass the protections in the first
round and exploit directly leakage from the second round to recover first round
keys. This is helpful for the attacker if only the first round is protected with, for
example, the masking countermeasure and highlights, again, the importance of
not only masking the outer rounds, as e.g. discussed in [3].
5.3 What happens if MixColumns leaks in parallel?
In Section 4, we assumed that the implementation computes MixColumns in a
serial fashion. In this section, we analyse the case when this no longer holds, i.e.,
the implementation computes and leaks in parallel (for example, a hardware
implementation using a 32-bit or 128-bit data path). In what follows we will
work with a reduced exemplary data path of 16 bits (2 bytes). (The implications
of the study can be extrapolated to any other bit width.)
Suppose that the observations O available to the attacker correspond to the
simultaneous leakage O = Ldevice(Z,N) of two output bytes z and n from first
round MixColumns. Suppose the attacker sets z as target (and therefore n will
be considered as “algorithmic noise”) and executes the attack of Section 4. We
can distinguish two cases:
1. The leakage contribution of Z can be “decoupled” from that of N. For in-
stance, Ldevice(Z,N) = HW(Z) + HW(N). Here the attacker can eventually
cancel the algorithmic noise induced by the term HW(N) (note that Z and
N are statistically independent) and the attack will succeed. Another exam-
ple of Ldevice that falls in this category is Ldevice(Z,N) = HW(SAES(Z)) +
HW(SAES(N)).
2. The leakage contribution of Z cannot be “decoupled” from that of N. For
instance, Ldevice(Z,N) = HW(Z⊕N). Here the attacker cannot cancel the
algorithmic noise (the signal from Z is effectively “masked” with N, which
by assumption is unknown to the attacker). Hence, the attack of Section 4
will not work. Another example that falls in this category is Ldevice(Z,N) =
HW(SHA(Z||N)) where || is concatenation and SHA is a cryptographic hash
function.
The requirement for a leakage behaviour to belong to the first category is
that the distribution of Ldevice(Z,N) should still be informative about Z when
the effect of N is marginalized, that is,
I(Z;EN[Ldevice(Z,N)]) > 0. (4)
In fact we can also use the example of a MIA attack against an injective
Sbox to illustrate the restriction of Eq. 4. We can rewrite Ldevice(Z,N) =
L0(L1(Z), L2(N)) where Z are 7 bits of the Sbox output and N is the other
bit of the Sbox output. If L0 is such that Eq. 4 holds, the trick of using drop1
will work. On the other hand, if L0 is such that Eq. 4 does not hold, the attack
will fail.
Hence, in the case of a parallel MixColumns implementation, if L0 is such that
Eq. 4 does not hold, we would have to redefine the target value as Z′ = (Z,N),
and we find ourselves in the same situation as if we were attacking a (large)
injective Sbox. Hence, we would need to choose another suitable non-injective
target, deeper in the algorithm, at the cost of more key hypotheses.
What does it mean to impose constraints on L0? We point out that these re-
strictions on L0 are easily met in practice. For example, the restrictions mean
that we can allow arbitrary cross-talk between the wires that represent Z, and
also arbitrary cross-talk between the wires that represent N, but there should
not be only significant cross-talk between wires from both variables. Or, equiv-
alently, leakage of Z can be “encrypted”, and also that of N, but not jointly
“encrypted”. Intuitively, we allow arbitrary leakage of Z and of N, but impose
some mild restrictions on how these individual leakages are combined (through
L0).
6 Conclusion
In this work, we elaborated on the practical properties of the bit drop trick,
pointed out how generic DPA attacks can be mounted on the AES and showed
their appealing properties when attacking devices with encrypted leakage or
exploiting leakage from inner rounds. Echoing the title, generic attacks are cer-
tainly endowed with two-sided properties - curse or blessing depending on the
concrete situation.
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